There was a brief instance when I thought that I might like to teach history. Within that moment of insanity, I imagined beginning a history class by putting on the board two competing quotes. George Santayana’s “Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it” (often misquoted as “Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it”), and Sting’s “History will teach us nothing”.
The realization that I would undoubtedly, as I turned around after writing this, receive blank stares rather than engaged discussion, led me to quickly abandon this fantasy. Still, within my own mind I continue to ponder these differing views of days gone by. This has only intensified as I have followed the debate over the Ukrainian crisis, and the inevitable cry of “Remember Munich” that it has elicited from pundits. It is a cry we hear again and again anytime there is an international crisis.
To briefly, and probably unnecessarily, recap, in 1938 Adolph Hitler, as the leader of Germany, threatened to invade Czechoslovakia so as to annex an area called the Sudetenland, which had a majority of ethnic Germans. In response, a meeting of state leaders was convened in Munich in an attempt to defuse the crisis. In the end, the French and British leaders forced the President of Czechoslovakia to accept a “compromise” that ceded the Sudetenland to Germany. The Czech army withdrew from the territory shortly thereafter, and the Germans marched in. While Hitler had proclaimed that this was the extent of his territorial ambitions in the area, he invaded and conquered the rest of Czechoslovakia less than a year later.
Ever since WWII began, the Munich Accord has been held up as emblematic of the dangers of appeasement. Even now, it is cited as a reason that we must confront Putin as he begins his attempted annexation of the Ukraine. It is also a prime example of why both Santayana and Sting may be correct. Munich is a warning about the dangers of caving to dictators, but it was also a unique situation that is not being replicated in the Ukraine, despite the fact that Putin seems to be borrowing from the Hitler playbook.
In 1938 there were serious questions as to whether Hitler could have taken back the Sudetenland had there been a unified resistance. The Czech army was formidable and well positioned. The German army was not yet the weapon it became within the next year and a half. Germany might well have prevailed against the Czechs alone, but not without significant losses. It is much more questionable whether they would have prevailed had the Brits and the French supported Czechoslovakia.
The current situation is different. The army of the Russian Federation is fully developed and prepared. The Ukraine will put up stiff resistance, but it is likely to be swiftly overrun. More importantly, that is unlikely to change even if we provide military support.
Plus, the stakes have changed. The weaponry today is totally different than it was in 1938. The potential for mass destruction is very real. Yes, Hitler could bomb cities, but he could not obliterate them. And that potential is not limited to the Ukraine, but includes virtually anywhere in the world. While I find it unlikely that Putin would go that far, I also did not think that he would brazenly claim the Ukraine.
So, Sting is correct. History teaches nothing. Well, maybe, maybe not. The Czech situation does provide insight into dictators with delusions of grandeur, like Putin (and Hitler). When dictators make claims for territory it is often gradual. First the Sudetenland. Then the rest of Czechoslovakia. Then on to Poland. First the Crimea. Then on to the separatist provinces. Then the rest of the Ukraine. From there, who knows (the Baltic states?).
The world’s reaction to Putin’s seizure of the Crimea in 2014 was tepid and short-lived. There were sanctions, but they were ineffective. Plus, Putin was soon welcomed back into the club of the world’s leaders as if nothing had happened. Is it any wonder that he assumed future annexations would meet a similarly purposeless response?
We are not in a position to intervene militarily to stop the invasion of the Ukraine. That is not because of a lack of preparedness, or a lack of will. It is just the reality that such an escalation would have such profound effects that it cannot be countenanced. Unfortunately, from a military perspective, the Ukraine must stand or, more likely, fall on its own.
Still the response must be swift, unified and unequivocal. This is where the importance of alliances becomes crucial. The United States and the rest of the world must speak with one voice in condemning this invasion, and ensuring that it has very real, long-lasting, economic consequences. Putin, and Russia, must become a pariah.
The fly in that ointment is China. It was not coincidental that a major Russia/China summit was held weeks before Russia attacked the Ukraine. Putin knows that he cannot avoid European condemnation, so he wanted to make sure that response did not include China. Considering Chinese territorial ambitions, Putin probably had little trouble in convincing Xi Jinping to remain neutral, if not supportive.
The Russian/Chinese pre-invasion détente sounds eerily similar to the Nazi/Soviet pact of 1939 that preceded the invasion of Poland (history repeating itself). The difference is that Chinese interests are not in the territory Putin seeks, as were Stalin’s with Hitler, but in a free hand, and reciprocal support from Russia, should China move aggressively against Taiwan or in the South China Sea (history teaches nothing).
Regardless of whether you want to view this conflict through the eyes of Santayana or Sting, one other truism stands firm. Violence will breed violence. There will be repercussions and they will not be pretty, nor will they be predictable. It will be a major miracle if this is confined to the Ukraine. Press on the balloon in the middle, and it will likely bulge out elsewhere.
*I understand that this may be outdated by the time I publish it, but that’s the way history crumbles.